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IV. THE DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION WAS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY OBTAINED 
WHEN HE WAS UNREPRESENTED AND HAD NOT WAIVED THE RIGHT TO 
COUNSEL AND RESENTENCING CANNOT CURE THE DEFECT. 
Bhatia's conviction was unconstitutional where he was not represented at the trial and did 
not waive that right to representation. Under both the United States Constitution and the Utah 
Constitution, Bhatia had the right to assistance of counsel at all critical stages of his criminal 
proceeding. State v. Hamilton. 732 P.2d 505, 506-07 (Utah 1986); U.S. Const, amendment VI; and 
Utah Const, art. I, Section 12. 
Utah law is settled on this point. "Absent evidence in the record of affirmative, knowing and 
intelligent action by [the Defendant] that might reasonably be construed as a waiver,... there has 
been no waiver and [the Defendant] is entitled to be represented by counsel at trial even if he chose 
not to be there himself. Because [the Defendant] was not represented by counsel at trial, his 
conviction was unconstitutionally obtained." Wagstaff v. Barnes. 802 P.2d 774, 779 (Utah App. 
1990). 
In the present case, the record is completely devoid of any affirmative, knowing and 
intelligent action by Bhatia which might be construed as a waiver of the right to be represented at 
trial. Rather, the record reflects that immediately prior to the commencement of the trial, Bhatia's 
counsel sought leave of the Court to withdraw with full knowledge that the court intended to go 
forward in absentia. TTP2. It is clear from the fact that Bhatia was not present at the time of either 
the motion or court order permitting his counsel to withdraw that Bhatia reasonably believed that 
his attorney was representing him in these proceedings even if he was absent. 
It is clear that Bhatia did not waive the right to be represented at trial. The court having 
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permitted his attorney to withdraw based solely on Bhatia's absence, Bhatia was unrepresented at 
trial. Because the record is devoid of any evidence of waiver of the right to be represented at trial, 
Bhatia's conviction was constitutionally obtained and must be overturned. West Valley City admits 
that the conviction was obtained in violation of Bhatia's constitutional right to counsel. 
West Valley City argues that because the action was a misdemeanor no right to counsel 
exists. While this is generally true, it does not apply where counsel has been appointed. Once the 
Defendant has asked for and received Court appointed counsel, he has the right to such counsel, 
regardless of the charges filed against him. Moreover, once the right to counsel has been granted 
by the Court, that right should attach throughout the proceedings regardless of the nature of the 
charges so filed. West Valley's attempt to diminish the impact of the unconstitutionally obtained 
conviction because of the nature of the charges simply ignores the facts of what transpired in this 
case. Bhatia's right to counsel once granted by the Court could not be vacated because of his 
absence from trial. 
Similarly, West Valley's suggestion that the error may be cured by resentencing is incorrect. 
West Valley relies on the case of Scott v. Illinois. 440 U.S. 367 (1979), which stands for the 
proposition that the right to counsel does not attach to cases where there is only the possibility of 
incarceration, especially in misdemeanor cases. Id, at 371. Admittedly, that is what Scott states. 
However, the instant case is different. In Scott, the court discussed the right to have counsel 
appointed. In the present case, counsel was in fact appointed. Thereafter, counsel was permitted 
to withdraw prior to the trial based solely on Bhatia's absence. While the right to counsel may be 
denied a defendant in a misdemeanor case, Bhatia believes that once the Defendant has requested 
counsel and that counsel has been appointed, the Court may not then permit counsel to withdraw 
leaving the defendant unrepresented at trial without evidence of an express waiver of the right to 
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counsel previously granted Bhatia by the Court. 
West Valley's argument that Bhatia should not profit from his cunning ways is equally 
inapplicable to the case at hand. State v. Meyers. 508 P.2d 41 (Utah 1973). Bhatia is not suggesting 
that the trial court had no right to try him in absentia. Rather, while the Court had the right to so try 
Bhatia in absentia, it did not have the right to do so without Bhatia being represented where it had 
previously appointed counsel. Assuming that the Court elected to proceed in absentia, Bhatia would 
not have profited from his absence insofar as the trial would have proceeded with counsel for 
defendant even in his absence. Bhatia does not believe that he should profit from his absence, 
however to the degree that the conviction must be overturned, the profit to Bhatia arises not from 
his behavior but rather from the violation of his right to counsel was first granted by the Court and 
at the trial vacated without any evidence of waiver by Bhatia other than his nonappearance at the 
trial. 
II. BHATIA DID NOT WAIVE HIS RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL. 
Bhatia did not waive his right to a jury trial. Admittedly, he executed a document between 
himself and his counsel which stated that if he failed to contact his counsel prior to the trial, he 
waived his right to a trial by jury. However, Bhatia does not believe that such a waiver should have 
been accepted by the Court. 
Bhatia believes that the document he executed as subject to the attorney-client privilege 
which privilege he had not waived. West Valley argues that somehow the execution of the 
document infers the intent to communicate the subject matter thereof to a third party thereby 
destroying the privilege. Pursuant to Rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence, it defines a communication 
as confidential 
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if it is not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than those to whom disclosure is 
in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those 
reasonably necessary for the transmission of the communication. 
Rule 504, Utah Rules of Evidence. The document on its face does not evidence an intent on the 
part of Bhatia to disclose the document and its content to third parties. As such, without further 
evidence surrounding the execution of the document and the purposes behind its execution, there 
cannot be inferred an intent on Bhatia's part that the document would be disclosed to third 
parties. 
Moreover, the case law of this state makes it clear that prior to the Court accepting a 
waiver of a right to a jury, it should carefully make a record of the extent and understanding of 
the defendant as to what is being waived. In State v. Garteiz. an immigrant defendant whose 
proficiency in English was marginal allegedly waived his right to a jury trial. State v. Garteiz. 
688 P.2d 487 (Utah 1984). In the per curiam opinion by Justice Durham, the Court stated, "I 
urge trial courts to undertake a careful explanation of the nature of the right to a jury trial before 
accepting a defendant's waiver thereof, particularly where the defendant's circumstances may 
appear on their face to create obstacles to his clear understanding of the choice he is making." 
Id. In the instant case, there is no record of whether or not Bhatia's counsel undertook a careful 
explanation of the nature of the right to a jury trial which attached when requested and granted 
by the trial court. Moreover, in State v. Moosman. 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1990), the Court stated, 
"This court places great emphasis on the importance of a defendant's understanding of the nature 
and extetn of the waiver of a jury trial." Again, there is no record which evidences that Bhatia 
understood the nature and extent of the document executed which purportedly acted as his 
knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily executed waiver of his right to a trial by jury. 
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CONCLUSION 
Bhatia's right to counsel attached when he requested counsel and the court so appointed 
counsel. This fact is true regardless of the nature of the offense for which he was charged. The 
Court violated his constitutional right to counsel by permitting counsel to withdraw prior to a 
trial in absentia. Resentencing will not cure the defect. Bhatia did not voluntarily waive the 
right to a trial by jury. There is no evidence that Bhatia intended the executed document to be 
released to any third party. Additionally, the right to a trial by jury attached when requested and 
granted and absent a record that any document executed which purportedly waived that right to a 
trial by jury was executed after a carefuly, thorough and complete explanation of the rights 
which were being waived should not have been accepted by the trial court. 
Dated and Signed this <x day of June, 2000. 
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